commit 00a771f5a8025404926f049a5ee23b1eb836581f Author: Sérgio M. Basto <sergio(a)serjux.com&gt; Date: Fri Dec 4 13:32:33 2020 +0000 Add fixes for kernel 5.10 VirtualBox-kmod.spec | 7 +- fixes_4.10.patch | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- diff --git a/VirtualBox-kmod.spec b/VirtualBox-kmod.spec index cf95719..32b612f 100644 --- a/VirtualBox-kmod.spec +++ b/VirtualBox-kmod.spec @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Name: VirtualBox-kmod Version: 6.1.16 -Release: 1%{?dist} +Release: 2%{?dist} #Release: 1%%{?prerel:.%%{prerel}}%%{?dist} Summary: Kernel module for VirtualBox @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ License: GPLv2 or CDDL URL: http://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/VirtualBox # This filters out the XEN kernel, since we don't run on XEN Source1: excludekernel-filter.txt +Patch1: fixes_4.10.patch %global AkmodsBuildRequires %{_bindir}/kmodtool, VirtualBox-kmodsrc >= %{version}%{vboxreltag}, xz, time, elfutils-libelf-devel, gcc @@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ Kernel module for VirtualBox %prep %setup -T -c tar --use-compress-program xz -xf %{_datadir}/%{name}-%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz +%patch1 -p0 pushd %{name}-%{version} popd @@ -131,6 +133,9 @@ DIRS=$(ls %{name}-%{version} |wc -l) %changelog +* Fri Dec 04 2020 Sérgio Basto <sergio(a)serjux.com&gt; - 6.1.16-2 +- Add fixes for kernel 5.10 + * Wed Oct 21 2020 Sérgio Basto <sergio(a)serjux.com&gt; - 6.1.16-1 - Update to 6.1.16 diff --git a/fixes_4.10.patch b/fixes_4.10.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a6b691 --- /dev/null +++ b/fixes_4.10.patch @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +diff -rup VirtualBox-kmod-6.1.16/vboxdrv/r0drv/linux/memobj-r0drv-linux.c VirtualBox-kmod-6.1.16.new/vboxdrv/r0drv/linux/memobj-r0drv-linux.c +--- VirtualBox-kmod-6.1.16/vboxdrv/r0drv/linux/memobj-r0drv-linux.c 2020-10-16 17:38:11.000000000 +0100 ++++ VirtualBox-kmod-6.1.16.new/vboxdrv/r0drv/linux/memobj-r0drv-linux.c 2020-12-04 13:05:02.345818731 +0000 +@@ -56,9 +56,12 @@ + * Whether we use alloc_vm_area (3.2+) for executable memory. + * This is a must for 5.8+, but we enable it all the way back to 3.2.x for + * better W^R compliance (fExecutable flag). */ +-#if RTLNX_VER_MIN(3,2,0) || defined(DOXYGEN_RUNNING) ++#if RTLNX_VER_RANGE(3,2,0, 5,10,0) || defined(DOXYGEN_RUNNING) + # define IPRT_USE_ALLOC_VM_AREA_FOR_EXEC + #endif ++#if RTLNX_VER_MIN(5,10,0) || defined(DOXYGEN_RUNNING) ++# define IPRT_USE_APPLY_TO_PAGE_RANGE_FOR_EXEC ++#endif + + /* + * 2.6.29+ kernels don't work with remap_pfn_range() anymore because +@@ -502,6 +505,42 @@ static void rtR0MemObjLinuxFreePages(PRT + } + + ++#ifdef IPRT_USE_APPLY_TO_PAGE_RANGE_FOR_EXEC ++/** ++ * User data passed to the apply_to_page_range() callback. ++ */ ++typedef struct LNXAPPLYPGRANGE ++{ ++ /** Pointer to the memory object. */ ++ PRTR0MEMOBJLNX pMemLnx; ++ /** The page protection flags to apply. */ ++ pgprot_t fPg; ++} LNXAPPLYPGRANGE; ++/** Pointer to the user data. */ ++typedef LNXAPPLYPGRANGE *PLNXAPPLYPGRANGE; ++/** Pointer to the const user data. */ ++typedef const LNXAPPLYPGRANGE *PCLNXAPPLYPGRANGE; ++ ++/** ++ * Callback called in apply_to_page_range(). ++ * ++ * @returns Linux status code. ++ * @param pPte Pointer to the page table entry for the given address. ++ * @param uAddr The address to apply the new protection to. ++ * @param pvUser The opaque user data. ++ */ ++static DECLCALLBACK(int) rtR0MemObjLinuxApplyPageRange(pte_t *pPte, unsigned long uAddr, void *pvUser) ++{ ++ PCLNXAPPLYPGRANGE pArgs = (PCLNXAPPLYPGRANGE)pvUser; ++ PRTR0MEMOBJLNX pMemLnx = pArgs->pMemLnx; ++ uint32_t idxPg = (uAddr - (unsigned long)pMemLnx->Core.pv) >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ ++ set_pte(pPte, mk_pte(pMemLnx->apPages[idxPg], pArgs->fPg)); ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif ++ ++ + /** + * Maps the allocation into ring-0. + * +@@ -584,6 +623,11 @@ static int rtR0MemObjLinuxVMap(PRTR0MEMO + else + # endif + { ++# if defined(IPRT_USE_APPLY_TO_PAGE_RANGE_FOR_EXEC) ++ if (fExecutable) ++ pgprot_val(fPg) |= _PAGE_NX; /* Uses RTR0MemObjProtect to clear NX when memory ready, W^X fashion. */ ++# endif ++ + # ifdef VM_MAP + pMemLnx->Core.pv = vmap(&pMemLnx->apPages[0], pMemLnx->cPages, VM_MAP, fPg); + # else +@@ -1851,6 +1895,21 @@ DECLHIDDEN(int) rtR0MemObjNativeProtect( + preempt_enable(); + return VINF_SUCCESS; + } ++# elif defined(IPRT_USE_APPLY_TO_PAGE_RANGE_FOR_EXEC) ++ PRTR0MEMOBJLNX pMemLnx = (PRTR0MEMOBJLNX)pMem; ++ if ( pMemLnx->fExecutable ++ && pMemLnx->fMappedToRing0) ++ { ++ LNXAPPLYPGRANGE Args; ++ Args.pMemLnx = pMemLnx; ++ Args.fPg = rtR0MemObjLinuxConvertProt(fProt, true /*fKernel*/); ++ int rcLnx = apply_to_page_range(current->active_mm, (unsigned long)pMemLnx->Core.pv + offSub, cbSub, ++ rtR0MemObjLinuxApplyPageRange, (void *)&Args); ++ if (rcLnx) ++ return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; ++ ++ return VINF_SUCCESS; ++ } + # endif + + NOREF(pMem); +diff -rup VirtualBox-kmod-6.1.16/vboxguest/r0drv/linux/memobj-r0drv-linux.c VirtualBox-kmod-6.1.16.new/vboxguest/r0drv/linux/memobj-r0drv-linux.c +--- VirtualBox-kmod-6.1.16/vboxguest/r0drv/linux/memobj-r0drv-linux.c 2020-10-16 17:38:11.000000000 +0100 ++++ VirtualBox-kmod-6.1.16.new/vboxguest/r0drv/linux/memobj-r0drv-linux.c 2020-12-04 13:07:32.088769617 +0000 +@@ -56,9 +56,12 @@ + * Whether we use alloc_vm_area (3.2+) for executable memory. + * This is a must for 5.8+, but we enable it all the way back to 3.2.x for + * better W^R compliance (fExecutable flag). */ +-#if RTLNX_VER_MIN(3,2,0) || defined(DOXYGEN_RUNNING) ++#if RTLNX_VER_RANGE(3,2,0, 5,10,0) || defined(DOXYGEN_RUNNING) + # define IPRT_USE_ALLOC_VM_AREA_FOR_EXEC + #endif ++#if RTLNX_VER_MIN(5,10,0) || defined(DOXYGEN_RUNNING) ++# define IPRT_USE_APPLY_TO_PAGE_RANGE_FOR_EXEC ++#endif + + /* + * 2.6.29+ kernels don't work with remap_pfn_range() anymore because +@@ -502,6 +505,42 @@ static void rtR0MemObjLinuxFreePages(PRT + } + + ++#ifdef IPRT_USE_APPLY_TO_PAGE_RANGE_FOR_EXEC ++/** ++ * User data passed to the apply_to_page_range() callback. ++ */ ++typedef struct LNXAPPLYPGRANGE ++{ ++ /** Pointer to the memory object. */ ++ PRTR0MEMOBJLNX pMemLnx; ++ /** The page protection flags to apply. */ ++ pgprot_t fPg; ++} LNXAPPLYPGRANGE; ++/** Pointer to the user data. */ ++typedef LNXAPPLYPGRANGE *PLNXAPPLYPGRANGE; ++/** Pointer to the const user data. */ ++typedef const LNXAPPLYPGRANGE *PCLNXAPPLYPGRANGE; ++ ++/** ++ * Callback called in apply_to_page_range(). ++ * ++ * @returns Linux status code. ++ * @param pPte Pointer to the page table entry for the given address. ++ * @param uAddr The address to apply the new protection to. ++ * @param pvUser The opaque user data. ++ */ ++static DECLCALLBACK(int) rtR0MemObjLinuxApplyPageRange(pte_t *pPte, unsigned long uAddr, void *pvUser) ++{ ++ PCLNXAPPLYPGRANGE pArgs = (PCLNXAPPLYPGRANGE)pvUser; ++ PRTR0MEMOBJLNX pMemLnx = pArgs->pMemLnx; ++ uint32_t idxPg = (uAddr - (unsigned long)pMemLnx->Core.pv) >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ ++ set_pte(pPte, mk_pte(pMemLnx->apPages[idxPg], pArgs->fPg)); ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif ++ ++ + /** + * Maps the allocation into ring-0. + * +@@ -584,6 +623,11 @@ static int rtR0MemObjLinuxVMap(PRTR0MEMO + else + # endif + { ++# if defined(IPRT_USE_APPLY_TO_PAGE_RANGE_FOR_EXEC) ++ if (fExecutable) ++ pgprot_val(fPg) |= _PAGE_NX; /* Uses RTR0MemObjProtect to clear NX when memory ready, W^X fashion. */ ++# endif ++ + # ifdef VM_MAP + pMemLnx->Core.pv = vmap(&pMemLnx->apPages[0], pMemLnx->cPages, VM_MAP, fPg); + # else +@@ -1851,6 +1895,21 @@ DECLHIDDEN(int) rtR0MemObjNativeProtect( + preempt_enable(); + return VINF_SUCCESS; + } ++# elif defined(IPRT_USE_APPLY_TO_PAGE_RANGE_FOR_EXEC) ++ PRTR0MEMOBJLNX pMemLnx = (PRTR0MEMOBJLNX)pMem; ++ if ( pMemLnx->fExecutable ++ && pMemLnx->fMappedToRing0) ++ { ++ LNXAPPLYPGRANGE Args; ++ Args.pMemLnx = pMemLnx; ++ Args.fPg = rtR0MemObjLinuxConvertProt(fProt, true /*fKernel*/); ++ int rcLnx = apply_to_page_range(current->active_mm, (unsigned long)pMemLnx->Core.pv + offSub, cbSub, ++ rtR0MemObjLinuxApplyPageRange, (void *)&Args); ++ if (rcLnx) ++ return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; ++ ++ return VINF_SUCCESS; ++ } + # endif + + NOREF(pMem);